Presidential Review by Easterbrook, Frank H.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 40 | Issue 4
1989
Presidential Review
Frank H. Easterbrook
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 905 (1989)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol40/iss4/5
ARTICLES
PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW
Frank H. Easterbrook*
JUDGES ARE FOND of claiming the power to say what the
law is. As the Supreme Court held in Marbury v. Madison,1 the
power to interpret the law includes the power to interpret the
Constitution. Sometimes judges make the bolder claim that only
they may interpret the law - or at least the Constitution.
No one would take seriously an assertion that the President
may not interpret federal law. After all, the President must carry
out the law, and faithful execution is the application of law to
facts. Before he can implement he must interpret. Executive
power to interpret the law is so well established, and so important
to successful operation of government, that courts frequently ac-
cept the executive branch's view of a statute as conclusive.2 But
what of the Constitution? Perhaps that is the exclusive preserve of
judges. I shall discuss the extent to which the President may act
on views at variance with statutory law, when persuaded that the
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer,
The Law School, The University of Chicago. This essay grows out of the Twelfth Sumner
Canary Lecture presented at the Law School of Case Western Reserve University on Feb-
ruary 7, 1990, and is Copyright by Frank H. Easterbrook. I thank Akhil R. Amar, Ruth
Bader Ginsberg, Larry Kramer, Hans A. Linde, Alan Meese, Geoffrey P. Miller, Richard
Murphy, Richard A. Posner, and Geoffrey R. Stone for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. One example is when the statute leaves play in the joints and delegates to an
agency. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984); Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 547-48 & n.4 (7th Cir.
1989); Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and Courts?, 7 YALE
J. REG. 1 (1990); Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DUKE LJ. 511.
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law departs from the Constitution.
Before I begin, the obligatory disclaimer. A federal judge is
like a ghost. He must be present and absent at the same time. I
speak to you with the knowledge that other judges may disagree,
and that when a case comes before me I shall try to divine the
view prevailing among my superiors rather than insist on an idio-
syncratic one. On top of that, I may have to apply qualifications
that I do not spell out here. All that said, however, I shall use a
broad brush, so that you may see the forest while remembering
that in the event of litigation I will not walk into a tree.
Example: President Reagan refused to implement part of the
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, which requires protests
over the awards of certain contracts to be referred to the Comp-
troller General, who is not part of the Executive Branch. President
Reagan thought the statute an unconstitutional intrusion on pow-
ers reserved to him by Article II. The Ninth Circuit, by contrast,
thought the President presumptuous-more, thought it un-consti-
tutional for the President to prefer the Constitution to a statute.
According to the court, the President not only violated the take
care clause but also invaded the judicial domain.3 On occasion the
Supreme Court has said similar things, although always in dicta.4
I
There is a long history of presidential action on the basis of
3. Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1119-26 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated in
immaterial part, 893 F.2d 205 (1989) (in banc). The District of Columbia Circuit took a
related view in Rafeedie v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 880 F.2d 506, 513-15
(D.C. Cir. 1989), and Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 843 F.2d
1444, 1455-56 (D.C. Cir. 1988). See Gressman, Take Care, Mr. President, 64 N.C.L. REv.
381 (1986). On the other hand, the District of Columbia circuit in National Wildlife Fed'n
v. ICC, 850 F.2d 694, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1988), remanded a case so that the agency could
consider a constitutional objection to its decision, and a series of cases dealing with the
"fairness doctrine" invited the FCC to junk its rules on constitutional grounds, e.g., Mere-
dith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 872-74 (D.C. Cir. 1987), a course it ultimately adopted.
Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
717 (1990); see Marozsan v. United States, 852 F.2d 1469, 1492 n.4 (7th Cir. 1988) (in
banc) (Easterbrook, J., with Coffey and Manion, JJ., dissenting).
4. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975), saying in dictum that "the
constitutionality of a statutory requirement [is] a matter which is beyond his jurisdiction to
determine." "His" referred to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. Many
similar assertions may be found in the cases, every last one of them as unreasoned. But see
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974) ("In the performance of assigned consti-
tutional duties each branch of the government must initially interpret the Constitution
. ." )
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constitutional views, sometimes views at variance with those of the
courts.' Four categories are unproblematic: pardons, vetoes, addi-
tions, and proposals for legislation. I give examples of presidential
actions in these categories without the slightest effort to be
comprehensive.
1. Pardons. A Federalist Congress enacted, and Federalist
judges enforced, the Sedition Act of 1798. On taking office Presi-
'dent Jefferson first instructed the United States Attorneys to cease
prosecuting violators and then pardoned all who had been con-
victed while the Federalists held sway. This effectively nullified
the statutes, as much as if the Supreme Court had held them un-
constitutional - which it was to do, on grounds similar to Jeffer-
son's, 163 years later.'
2. Vetoes. The Nation's inaugural veto was cast exclusively on
constitutional grounds. President Washington vetoed the first bill
apportioning representatives among states, calling it unconstitu-
tional because it gave too many representatives to the smaller
states, implying that it left too few for Virginia.7 Secretary of
State Jefferson, another prominent Virginian, wrote the veto mes-
sage. President Madison vetoed on constitutional grounds a bill
chartering a church in the District of Columbia.' Then there was
a cause c~l~bre: after the Supreme Court held in Osborn v. Bank
of the United States9 that Congress has the power to establish a
national bank, Congress reauthorized the Bank. President Jackson
vetoed the bill, concluding that the Supreme Court was wrong and
the statute unconstitutional.' Jackson's veto was controversial -
but because he invoked reasons in addition to constitutional ones!
5. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 22-26 (11th ed.
1985) and Lee, The Provinces of Constitutional Interpretation, 61 TUL L. REV. 1009,
1012-14 (1987) collect presidential views on the subject. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DAN-
GEROUS BRANCH 260-64 (1962).
6. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-76 (1964); see H. KALVEN,
A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 63-68 (1988).
7. 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897
124 (J. Richardson ed. 1896) [hereinafter COMPILATION] (veto message Apr. 5, 1792).
Both the bill and the veto created a national stir, and Washington's cabinet was sorely
divided. See 5 J. MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 279-84 (1807).
8. 1 COMPILATION, supra note 7, at 489-90 (veto message Feb. 21, 1811); see
American Jewish Congress v. Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 136-37 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting).
9. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
10. 2 COMPILATION, supra note 7, at 581-91 (veto message July 10, 1832).
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Until Jackson's bold step, many believed that the veto should be
exercised exclusively on constitutional grounds.11
3. Additions. If a statute says "do at least X," the President may
decide to do more because he believes the Constitution requires
more. This is a common response to procedural shortcomings. The
Lloyd-LaFollette Act, the charter of the civil service system, pro-
vides hearings on discharge, which became inadequate in light of
revisionist interpretations of the due process clause. The-President
may add the necessary procedures. Presidents may add procedures
and do "more," in other ways, on instrumental grounds too; not
all decisions depend on constitutional imperatives. 2
4. Proposals for new legislation. President Franklin Roosevelt
asked Congress to enact laws that were out of step with Lochner
because he did not accept the soundness of that case and the skein
of substantive due process results. He wanted to strike off on a
different course and asked Congress to go with him. It did, and
during the next four years the Court held the central components
of the package unconstitutional, triggering the Court-packing plan
and sorely tempting him to decline to implement one of its
decisions.13
Pardons, vetoes, additions, and proposals for laws are not
problematic because they do not subvert the take care clause. Pro-
posals ask for laws the President may execute faithfully; vetoes
11. Black, On the Veto, 40 L. & Contemp. Prob. 87 (1976); see R. REMINI, ANDREW
JACKSON AND THE BANK WAR: A STUDY IN THE GROWTH OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER
(1967).
12. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 543-49 (1978), pointedly saying that agencies may adopt proce-
dures exceeding statutory minima, while courts have no power to demand that they do so.
13. President Roosevelt prepared a speech to deliver if the Court should strike down
the legislation abrogating "gold clauses" in federal obligations. He planned to quote from
Lincoln's First Inaugural Address (to be discussed below) and add:
To stand idly by and to permit the decision of the Supreme Court to be carried
through to its logical, inescapable conclusion would so imperil the economic and
political security of this nation that the legislative and executive officers of the
Government must look beyond the narrow letter of contractual obligations, so
that they may sustain the substance of the promise originally made in accord
with the actual intention of the parties."
F.D.R. - His PERSONAL LETTERS 1928-1945 459-60 (E. Roosevelt ed. 1950) (Proposed
Speech on the Gold Clause Cases (Feb. 1935)). The Court sustained the legislation, Perry
v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935), so the President did not deliver the speech. See
Dam, From the Gold Clause Cases to the Gold Commission: A Half Century of American
Monetary Law, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 504, 509-18 (1983).
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stop bills from becoming laws; in neither case is the take care
clause activated. Additional process also does not "violate" or "in-
validate" a statute. Pardons do frustrate the implementation of
laws, but as all pardons do so to some degree, the existence of the
pardon clause must authorize nonenforcement, at least at retail
rather than wholesale. So too with the President's ability to de-
cline criminal prosecution in the first place. What one President
may omit, a successor may countermand and nullify.
Casting vetoes and granting pardons on grounds of politics or
prudence is acceptable; 4 how odd it would be if a President, free
to consider the welfare of donors in casting vetoes, could not con-
sider the Constitution! That would reverse the original practice, in
which Presidents gave exclusively constitutional grounds for their
vetoes.
Presidents often justify their vetoes, pardons, additions, and
proposals on broader grounds. Consider President Thomas Jeffer-
son's explanation for the pardons of those~convicted under the Se-
dition Act:
[N]othing in the Constitution has given [the judiciary] a right
to decide for the Executive, more than to the executive to decide
for them. Both magistracies are equally independent in the
sphere of action assigned to them. The judges, believing the
[law] constitutional, had a right to pass a sentence of fine and
imprisonment, because that power was placed in their hands by
the Constitution. But the executive, believing the law unconsti-
tutional, was bound to remit the execution of it; because that
power had been confided to him by the Constitution. That in-
strument meant that its coordinate branches should be checks on
each other. But the opinion which give to the judges the right to
decide what laws are constitutional, and what are not, not only
for themselves in their own sphere of action, but for the Legisla-
ture & Executive also, in their spheres, would make the judici-
ary a despotic branch.' 5
Or consider President Andrew Jackson's explanation for his veto
of the bill chartering the second Bank of the United States.
14. See C. Black, The People and the Court 81 (1960) ("the President can veto for
any reason that appeals to him"). Chester J. Antieau, in THE EXECUTIVE VETO (1988),
collects vetoes and the Presidents' grounds for their decisions.
15. 8 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 310-11 (P. Ford ed. 1897) (letter to Abigail
Adams dated Sept. 11, 1804); see G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, 2 HISTORY OF THE SU-
PREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 148-49 (1981); C. PATTERSON, THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 117-25 (1953).
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The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself
be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution. Each public
officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution swears that
he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is under-
stood by others. It is as much the duty of the House of Repre-
sentatives, of the Senate, and of the President to decide upon the
constitutionality of any bill or resolution which may be
presented to them for passage or approval as it is of the supreme
judges when it may be brought before them for judicial decision.
The opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress
than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on that
point the President is independent of both. The authority of the
Supreme Court must not, therefore, be permitted to control the
Congress or the Executive when acting in their legislative capac-
ities, but to have only such influence as the force of their reason-
ing may deserve. 16
Both Presidents Jefferson and Jackson contended that no law may
go into force unless all three branches agree that it is constitu-
tional. Each, acting within its sphere, has the power to say no:
Congress not to enact, the President not to approve in his legisla-
tive role or enforce in his executive role, and the Court to set
aside.
President Abraham Lincoln expressed stronger thoughts in
his debates with Stephen Douglas, allowing on the one hand that
Dred Scott17 bound Scott to his master and asserting on the other
that the case had no broader significance:
We nevertheless do oppose [that decision] as a political rule
which shall be binding on the voter, to vote for nobody who
thinks it wrong, which shall be binding on the members of Con-
gress or the President to favor no measure that does not actually
concur with the principles of that decision. . . . If I were in
Congress, and a vote should come up on a question whether
slavery should be prohibited in a new Territory, in spite of the
Dred Scott decision, I would vote that it should.-8
In his First Inaugural Address President Lincoln reaffirmed that
view when explaining that he would propose and enforce legisla-
tion inconsistent with the principle underlying Dred Scott: that as
a matter of substantive due process, no person of African origin
16. 2 COMPILATION, supra note 7, at 582.
17. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
18. Sixth Lincoln-Douglas debate at Quincy, Oct. 13, 1858, in 3 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 255 (R. Basler ed. 1953).
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could be a citizen of the United States. Lincoln said:
[T]he candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Gov-
ernment upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be
irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant
they are made in ordinary litigation between private parties in
personal actions, the people will have ceased to be their own
rules, having to that extent practically resigned their Govern-
ment into the hands of that eminent tribunal. 9
Here we encounter the assertion that a law deemed constitutional
by legislative and executive branches may go into force without
the judiciary's approbation, a much broader claim of executive au-
thority than either Jefferson or Jackson advanced.
II
A brief detour is appropriate. People sometimes find asser-
tions of presidential power irksome because they think such a
power would give the President the upper hand in the struggle
with Congress. If the executive department has this power, would
it not gain too much at the expense of Congress? When this
thought comes to mind, it is well to remember that the legislative
branch has its own role in interpreting the Constitution." Legisla-
tive constitutional interpretive powers parallel those of the Presi-
dent, and some of these are also non-controversial.
(1) Any legislator may vote against a bill on constitutional
grounds, including grounds that the Supreme Court has rejected.
(2) Legislators may vote for a bill that the Court has held
unconstitutional, in order to prompt change. Roosevelt's Congress
of 100 Days challenged Lochner in this fashion; after the Court
held much of the program unconstitutional, Congress reenacted
the laws with a thin veneer; it eventually prevailed. Congress chal-
lenged the Supreme Court's decision that it may not regulate the
wages and hours of state and local officials by enacting more such
19. First Inaugural Address, Mar. 6, 1861, in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRA-
HAM LINCOLN, supra note 18, at 268.
20. See Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and its Powers to Counter
Judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REV. 57 (1986); Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide
to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1985); Fisher, Constitutional In-
terpretation by Understanding Members of Congress, 63 N.C.L. REV. 707 (1985); Hickok,
The Framers' Understanding of Constitutional Deliberation in Congress, 21 GA. L. REV.
217 (1986); Ross, Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection, 72 MINN. L. REV. 311
(1987); Note, The Senate and the Constitution, 97 YALE L. J. 1111 (1988).
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laws. It has prevailed in this fight.2' State legislatures regularly
enact laws concerning abortion in order to challenge Roe v.
Wade,22 and the contours of that decision have changed under
pressure.23 Legislation that bumps against accepted bounds is a
force for change as legitimate as the arguments of lawyers who
try to curtail governmental powers by asking for the invalidation
of laws previously sustained. There is no ratchet in constitutional
law.
(3) Congress may impeach and remove from office all who
violate the Constitution, as Congress understands it. The principal
efforts -the impeachment and acquittal of Samuel Chase and
Andrew Johnson, the campaigns to impeach Earl Warren and
William 0. Douglas - came to naught, but the power is there.
The impeachment of Richard Nixon fits this pattern, although his
resignation prevented resolution.
(3A) Impeachment does not exhaust the tools for enforcing
the legislature's view of the Constitution. If Congress enacts a
War Powers Act and the President goes his merry way in reliance
on a more expansive view of executive power (and a stingy view of
legislative power), Congress need not give up. It may refuse to
enact defense appropriations bills or may take away the Presi-
dent's helicopters or enact a national health bill the President's
supporters abhor. For two hundred years, the House of Represent-
atives has enforced its constitutional prerogative to initiate tax
legislation by the mundane expedient of refusing to approve tax
bills devised by the Senate.24 The power of the purse is potent,
and Congress has carte blanche at every turn. It is why the Fram-
ers feared Congress above all other internal dangers to the
Republic.
(4) There is the extraordinary power to interpret and change
the meaning of the 14th and 15th Amendments. Congress may
enact laws expressly disagreeing with the Supreme Court's view of
21. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
22. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
23. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
24. E.g., 132 Cong. Rec. 26,202 (1986); 106 Cong. Rec. 15,818-19 (1960); Cong.
Globe, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 1666-67 (1859). Authorities are collected in C. CANNON, 6
CANNON'S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES §§ 314-15 (1935); L.
DESCHLER, 3 DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES HOuSE OF REPRESENTA-
TIVES ch. 13, §3 (1974); A. HINDS, 2 HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-
TIVES ch. 47 (1907).
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these amendments - and the Court has said it will acquiesce in
light of the power to legislate those amendments confer. 5
Given this assortment of constitutional powers, the legislature
is in no danger if we recognize in the President some scope for
constitutional decision.
III
Now for a fifth presidential example that is not controversial
in practice but should be so in theory. A President may refuse to
enforce a law that is "like" one held invalid by the courts. In the
1970s the Court struck down sex differences in social welfare
laws. 28 The Department of Justice trudged through these statutes
identifying similar gender-based rules and instructing the Execu-
tive Branch not to follow them. In the end the Supreme Court
decided only five or six Social Security sex discrimination cases,
and the remainder of the sex-based provisions were carved out of
the law by administrative decision, or on occasion by decisions of
district judges that were not appealed and were acquiesced in na-
tionwide - a step that is functionally a final constitutional deci-
sion by the Executive Branch.
The Attorney General, on the advice of the Solicitor General
and the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Coun-
sel, decided not to enforce so many statutes that Congress re-
quired the Department of Justice to notify counsel for House and
Senate when the Administration decided not to appeal from a de-
cision holding a statute unconstitutional .27 A few of these non-en-
forcement decisions even reached the Supreme Court by the back
door, and the Court did not seem restive that constitutional ques-
tions had been resolved by another branch. One of these came up
when the Department of Justice stopped enforcing a sex-based
rule in the Social Security Act after "the Solicitor General . . .
concluded that the statutory presumption could not be defended
under the standards announced by this Court." 2 Disputes about
25. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 128-29 (1971); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641 (1966). See Carter, The Morgan "'Power" and the Forced Reconsideration of
Constitutional Decisions, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 819 (1986), treating Morgan as a privilege in
Congress to disagree with the Court and compel it to re-think, with a slant in Congress'
favor.
26. See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199 (1977).
27. E.g., 2 U.S.C. §288k(b) (1988) (notice to Senate counsel).
28. Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 870, 873 n.2 (1984).
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the appropriate remedy took the case to the Court, which held
that because the Executive Branch quit enforcing the law, a rem-
edy for persons claiming injury would not be deemed one based on
the Constitution.
Assuming the Court's opinions have generality and force be-
yond the parties, the President must have the ability to declare
laws unconstitutional in the course of applying the governing
rules. To apply the rules includes the power to interpret them. I
shall come back to this, because it is illuminating. If the President
may go beyond a decision's four corners to implement "the princi-
ple" found there, he must have the ability to implement a princi-
ple even when others disagree with his interpretation. Next we
shall wonder what counts as a "similar" decision. That will de-
pend on the level of generality selected, a question to which there
is no right answer. To grant the President the power to generalize
is to grant him the power to make independent constitutional
decisions.
IV
Now for some controversial decisions. Let me give several, all
involving a decision by the President not to enforce a law even
when there is no decision on point by the Supreme Court.
I. President Reagan's decision not to enforce the part of the
Competition in Contracting Act requiring references to the
Comptroller General.
2. Many presidents' decisions not to carry out laws with
one-house veto provisions, in advance of the decision holding all
such laws unconstitutional.2"
3. Congress enacted the Federal Advisory Committee Act,
requiring open meetings by groups "utilized by one or more
agencies, on the interest of obtaining advice or recommendations
for the President.130 Does the Act apply to the ABA's Standing
Committee on the Judiciary, which advises the President, before
he makes nominations, whether someone would be a good fed-
eral judge? President Ford concluded that it does but refused to
enforce the law because he thought it an unconstitutional re-
striction on his ability to make nominations. He did so on the
advice of Attorney General Levi, who acted on advice of Assis-
29. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); see Elliott,
The Administrative Constitution, The Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 S. CT.
REV. 125.
30. 5 U.S.C. App. § 3(2)(c) (1988).
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tant Attorney General Scalia.3 ' Fifteen years later the question
reached the Supreme Court. Three Justices agreed with this
view; five turned handsprings to construe the law as inapplicable
in order to avoid the problem.32 One member of the Court kept
his thoughts to himself: Justice Scalia.
4. President Wilson appoints a postmaster, later changes his
mind and fires him despite a law giving him tenure; President
Truman appoints a member of the War Claims Commission,
whom President Eisenhower fires despite statutory tenure. For-
mer President Taft, who lost the election to President Wilson in
1912, was Chief Justice by the time the controversy over his
successor's action reached the Court. Taft vindicated Wilson.
Justice Frankfurter rebuffed Eisenhower. Neither suggested that
the President transgressed constitutional limits on his role in
putting the statute to a test.33
5. Ongoing disputes about intelligence operations and the
War Powers Act. No President has implemented the War Pow-
ers Act. Many have given notices that they call "consistent"
with it, in order to compromise political disputes, but not one
has conceded that the Act binds him in the event he has a view
of the international situations that differs from the one held by
Congress.
6. The patriarch of cases of defiance: President Andrew
Johnson sacks Secretary of War Edwin Stanton despite the Ten-
ure of Office Act, which provided that no cabinet secretary
could be relieved until his successor had been confirmed. Secre-
tary Stanton refused to budge; President Johnson was im-
peached; only his acquittal by the Senate persuaded Stanton to
vamoose. 34 Just as the Court declared the Sedition Act unconsti-
tutional 163 years after President Jefferson issued -his blanket
pardon, so the Court sustained President Andrew Johnson's con-
stitutional views 60 years later, in the course of vindicating Pres-
ident Wilson's discharge of Postmaster Myers.35
31. Letter from Attorney General William B. Saxbe to the American Bar Associa-
tion, discussed in History of Appointments to Supreme Court, 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel
457, 473 & n.54 (1980).
32. Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558 (1989).
33. The two cases are Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), and Wiener v.
United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958). See Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102
HARv. L. REv. 105, 129-34 (1988); Entin, The Removal Power and the Federal Deficit:
Form, Substance, and Administrative Independence, 75 Ky. L.J. 699 (1987). Myers and
Wiener present different executive claims; in Myers to be free of legislative control, and in
Wiener to operate a unitary executive. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). For
current purposes the distinction is unimportant.
34. H. TREFOUSSE, ANDREW JOHNSON 276-78, 293-334 (1989).
35. Myers, 272 U.S. at 164-76.
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Must Presidents comply with such laws until 60 or 160 years have
gone by and a justiciable case or controversy reaches the Supreme
Court? The argument that the President must do so follows one of
five lines: '(1) the take care clause; (2) expertise - judges have it
and Executive Branch doesn't; (3) chaos, which devours us if
there are competing voices on constitutional issues; (4) Congress'
greater power not to enact the statute implies the power to have it
enforced as written; and occasionally (5) signing the bill waives
the right to object to it.
A
Four of these five are makeweights. Start with the fourth: the
greater power includes the lesser. Justice Holmes once advanced
this argument.36 Greater-includes-the-lesser failed to carry the
day when Holmes used it to explain why you could fire a police-
man on account of speech, and the approach that defeated
Holmes's position came to be known as the "unconstitutional con-
ditions doctrine." The contention fares no better when dealing
with the apportionment of powers among branches. It implies that
all laws satisfy the Constitution, which Holmes did not believe. It
also implies that judges, too, are without authority to question the
constitutionality of statutes. Holmes did not believe that either.
The argument is equally unsuccessful even if recast as an asser-
tion that the capacious power of Congress makes the law constitu-
tional, not that it defeats the power of the President to express a
view.
Now for "expertise." Here's an irrelevant characteristic. The
Supreme Court did not invalidate one federal statute during the
50 years between Marbury and Dred Scott; many judges of state
courts rarely consider constitutional questions; in neither case does
power evaporate with lack of experience. Judges have disinterqst
more than they have expertise, yet they engage in judicial review
even when their own posers are at stake. Professors of constitu-
tional law have both disinterest and expertise yet no power. Gov-
ernmental powers go with the office, not with professional skills.
Be that as it may, if expertise is important it parades down the
halls of the executive branch.
The President (or anyone else in the Executive Branch) acts
on the advice of the Attorney General, who relies on the Solicitor
36. Id. at 177 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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General and the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Le-
gal Counsel. To say that the President lacks expertise is to say
that these people - the real decision-makers - lack expertise.
Yet in the last 20 years the occupants of these offices include Grif-
fin B. Bell (AG 1977-79),'Robert H. Bork (SG 1973-77), Wade
H. McCree, Jr. (SG 1977-81), William H. Rehnquist (OLC
1969-71), Antonin Scalia (OLC 1974-77), and Kenneth F. Starr
(SG 1989- ), to list only those who were federal judges before or
since. Others were or are distinguished professors of law; still
others were or are at the top of the bar. Earlier occupants-turned-
judge include William Howard Taft, Charles Evans Hughes, Rob-
ert Jackson, Stanley Reed, Thurgood Marshall, Charles Fahy, Si-
mon Sobeloff, George Thomas Washington, my colleague Walter
J. Cummings - and the man who wrote the President's veto mes-
sage on the Bank of the United States, Roger Brooke Taney! It is
said in the halls of Congress that what goes around comes around.
Piesident Lincoln was to treat Taney's opinion in Dred Scott with
the same tender mercies that Taney and President Jackson re-
served for Marshall's opinion in Osborn.
Next comes waiver. One could say that a President consents
by signing the bill, that refusal to comply is a form of line-item
veto. To insist that the President's signature on a bill compels him
to enforce the law is to say that with the stroke of a pen a Presi-
dent may eliminate constitutional objections - may create extra-
constitutional (perhaps contra-constitutional) institutions on his
own volition. "Agreement" of this character does not override lim-
itations in the fundamental document. No one may consent to vio-
late the Constitution, or bind his successor to do so." Anyway,
Presidents often sign bills despite objections to some portions of
them, because the remainder is beneficial or even necessary. 8
Sticking an unconstitutional proviso into the bill setting the debt
ceiling - a bill the President must sign to keep the government in
operation - does not dispatch the constitutional problem.3 9
As for chaos: There is only one President. The Executive
37. Although it is out of place in this essay to answer an argument by relying on the
Supreme Court, I'll succumb this one time. Myers allowed President Wilson to refuse, on
constitutional grounds, to carry out a bill he signed into law. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976); Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 556-57'(1977)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
38. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1353 (1953).
39. Sidah & Smith, Four Faces of the Line Item Veto: A Reply to Tribe and Kur-
land, 84 Nw. U.L. REv. 437, 452-57 (1990).
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Branch can act in a unified way. Someone desiring chaos could do
no better than to delegate constitutional questions to more than
20,000 state judges, or 600 federal district judges, whose work is
reviewed by more than 150 circuit judges sitting in panels of
three! That way lies babble - and we have fulfilled all expecta-
tions. A unitary Executive always does better at avoiding chaos
than does a hydra-headed, uncoordinated judiciary.40 This was,
after all, one of the principal arguments for a unitary executive in
1787.
People commonly overstate the extent to which divergence of
opinion and practice breeds "chaos." Tension and enduring disa-
greement are not chaos. Presidents are at loggerheads with Con-
gress repeatedly, and the two houses of Congress with each other.
Separation of powers - the inability of any one person or branch
to have its way - was thought to be an essential component of a
free republic, not a hindrance to good government. We know from
the supremacy clause that state executive officials must put the
Constitution ahead of state and federal law.4 Is this acceptable
while the similar decision of a single President produces chaos?
Unlikely.
Other nations have taken separation further. France has
three systems of courts, each supreme within its province. The
Conseil Constitutionnel may declare laws unconstitutional before
they go into force but not thereafter; the Cour de Cassation and
the Counseil d'Etat owe no respect to the decisions of the Coun-
seil Constitutionnel and lack the powers that we identify with ju-
dicial review. Chaos has not broken out in France as a result.
Civilian legal systems also deny precedential force to judicial
decisions. They insist that the code - the statute or constitution
is the only law, and that judicial decisions are glosses with the
same force as scholarly commentary, maybe a little less.42 In these
legal systems professors have more prestige than judges. 3 The ab-
40. See generally Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 802
(1982), for an explanation why an unitary decision-maker will do better than any multiple-
member political body, a category that includes the Supreme Court.
41. Alleghany Corp. v. Haase, 896 F.2d 1046, 1054-56 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easter-
brook, J., concurring); Cooper v. Eugene School Dist. No. 4J, 301 Or. 358, 361 & n.7, 723
P.2d 299, 302-03 & n.7 (1986).
42. See J. MERRYMAN & D. CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN EUROPE AND
LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 551-87 (1978).
43. A point forcefully brought home to one of Justice Scalia's children, who proudly
told a European family with whom she was staying that her father had become a judge,
only to learn that her hosts assumed that her father must have been disgraced to accept
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sence of "precedent" as we know it greatly enlarges the discretion
of the legislative and executive branches, again without bringing
civilization to a close. The great western democracies have very
different legal systems but fundamentally similar economic and le-
gal realms.
B
This leaves the take care clause. The President must enforce,
not negate. Simple - and very misleading.
For the President must take Care that the "Laws" are execu-
tive. Is the Constitution a "law"? If so, then the President must
execute it too. In any contest between statute and Constitution,
the Constitution wins.
To tell whether the President may put the Constitution over a
law, step back and ask: Why may a judge put the Constitution
first? The answer Chief Justice Marshall gave in Marbury is sim-
ple: that the Constitution is law."
- We departed from the United Kingdom by having a written
aIid therefore an enforceable constitution.
- The Constitution establishes a structure of separated and
limited powers, implying enforceable limits.
- The supremacy clause gives a hierarchy, with the Constitu-
tion on top. Although technically it refers to state judges rather
than federal ones, the clause implies a structure binding every
public officer, one in which the Constitution prevails over com-
peting sources of legal obligation.
- All officers take an oath to that hierarchy.
So in the event of conflict the Constitution wins. The tough ques-
tion in Marbury was not whether the Constitution trumps a stat-
ute, but who interprets the meaning of the Constitution: Congress
when it enacts the law, the President when he executes, or the
Court when it decides cases and controversies? Why not say that
the legislature or President, on acting, resolved the constitutional
questions?
John Marshall's answer was essentially: "Every man for him-
self." Each official owes the same duty to the hierarchy and must
such a demotion. See R.B. Ginsburg, Thoughts on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REv.
133, 136 (1990).
44. See Easterbrook, Approaches to Judicial Review, in THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY:
AN ENDURING CONSTITUTION IN A CHANGING WORLD 147 (J. David & R. McKay eds.
1989).
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make his own decision. Judges can't knuckle under to the view of
others, it is the Constitution, not someone else's view about the
Constitution, that governs.
The claim is especially strong when the decision is self-deny-
ing. Ability to construe for myself is at its apex when an actor is
denying his own power. Marbury did not impose duties on other
branches or proclaim that others must agree. The Justices said
only that Congress cannot compel them to hear a case that they
believe the Constitution does not allow them to decide.
Now translate to the President the rationales of constitutional
review.
If we accept Alexander Hamilton's justification for judicial
review - that unconstitutional enactments are simply not "law"
and do not bind anyone4" - then there is no distinction between
judge and President. The Supreme Court has said more times
than one can count that unconstitutional statutes are "no law at
all.""' Add the observation that what is "no law" can't bind the
Executive Branch, and the argument is complete. Marbury itself
used functional rather than formal arguments, however, and these
carry over completely.
- The Constitution is law, a source of rules.
- The hierarchy is the same.
- The duty is to Constitution and its structure.
- Every man for himself: the President can't kowtow to Con-
gress' view any more than the Court will. Especially given the
unique presidential oath to the Constitution in article II, section
1, clause 7: "I do solemnly swear that I will faithfully execute
the office of President of the United States and will, to the best
of my Ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of
the United States." Nothing there about executing laws while
ignoring the Constitution!
- Non-enforcement of a law is a modest, self-denying power
along the lines of Marbury. Even when the power is invoked in
support of one's own position (a President protects executive
powers, as he perceives them, from legislative encroachment),
the President does not insist that anyone else agree.
Self-denial is the sort of power that even Jefferson ap-
proved.41 Jefferson was not at the constitutional convention, but
45. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 491-93 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
46. E.g., Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886).
47. As Jefferson wrote to Spencer Roane, "[e]ach of the three departments has
equally the right to decide for itself what is its duty under the constitution, without any
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Madison was and approved of this view:
[E]ach [department] must in the exercise of its functions be
guided by the text of the Constitution according to his own in-
terpretation of it; and that consequently in the event of irrecon-
cilable interpretations, the prevalence of one or the other depart-
ment must depend on the nature of the case, as receiving its
final decision from one or the other, and passing from that deci-
sion into effect, without involving the functions of any other.48
James Wilson, the author of article III of the Constitution, saw
things the same way. During the debates in Pennsylvania on the
ratification of the Constitution, Wilson had this to say:
I say, under this constitution, the legislature may be restrained
and kept within its prescribed bounds by the interposition of the
judicial department. . . .I had occasion on a former day to
state that the power of the constitution was paramount to the
power of the legislature acting under that constitution. For it is
possible that the legislature, when acting in that capacity, may
transgress the bounds assigned to it, and an act may pass in the
usual mode notwithstanding that transgression; but when it
comes to be discussed before the judges, when they consider its
principles, and find it to be incompatible with the superior pow-
ers of the constitution, it is their duty to .pronounce it void; and
judges independent, and not obliged to look to every session for
a continuance of their salaries, will behave with intrepidity and
refuse to the act the sanction of judicial authority. In the same
manner the President of the United States could shield himself
and refuse to carry into effect an act that violates the
constitution. 4
regard to what the others may have decided for themselves under a similar question."
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819) reprinted in 12 WORKS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 139 (P. Ford ed. 1905). Jefferson was consistent. In his NOTES ON THE
STATE OF VIRGINIA (1784), written before the drafting of the Constitution and discussed
by Madison in the 49th Federalist. Madison stated that the "several departments, being
perfectly coirdinate by the terms of their common commission, none of them, it is evident,
can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between their re-
spective powers." THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 348 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961). The
quotation is from Madison's exposition of Jefferson's views. Madison disputes Jefferson's
conclusion that because the departments have equal powers all disputes must be resolved
by the people; he does not, however, disagree with Jefferson's view of the right of each
department to equal claim to determine the limits of its powers.
48. E. Burns, JAMES MADISON: PHILOSOPHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 187 (1968) (re-
print of 1938 original) quoting from one of Madison's unpublished memoranda. See id. at
159-60 186-89 for Burns's summary of Madison's approach.
49. PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF 1787-1788 304-05 (J. Mc-
Master & F. Stone eds. 1888).
1989-901
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Notice that Wilson first justifies judicial review and then equates
the President with the judges in ability and authority to set the
Constitution over a statute. 50
C
If arid logic and history do not persuade, what about an ex-
ample? Inflamed by the latest scandal in defense procurement,
Congress passes this law:
Section 1. The President shall execute the CEO of Apex Mis-
siles Corporation and the claque that surrounds him, and he
shall confiscate their property, and none of their lineal
descendents shall be eligible for any office under the United
States, or any of them.
Section 2. No court of the United States shall have jurisdictionto review acts required by Section 1.
This is a bill of attainder (with the corruption-of-blood feature
that the Framers detested). Whether or not the view-preclusion
section works, the President must decide whether to dispatch the
firing squad. Is the President obliged to rub out the CEO and dis-
possess his heirs? Or could (must) he say: This is a bill of attain-
der, and my duty to carry out the Constitution trumps any obliga-
tion to carry out this law? This is a self-answering question. Even
Jefferson, who thought ill of judicial review in general, and John
Marshall in particular, conceded the power of each Department to
decide for itself whether the law is consistent with constitutional
imperatives.
If there is doubt, how about the next question in line: The
Supreme Court holds the law unconstitutional as applied to the
CEO, but a member of the claque (call him Lovett) did not obtain
judicial review. Must the President execute Lovett, or may he say
that the constitutional principle has been established in the CEO's
case? If the President may not set the Constitution above the law,
why may he spare Lovett on the basis of a decision in a stranger's
case? Why, indeed, could he spare the CEO? The judicial deci-
sion is just an interpretation of the Constitution, and if for the
Executive Branch the law is superior to the Constitution then it
trumps the judicial decision too! But if the President may spare
Lovett on the basis of the decision in the CEO's lawsuit, why can't
50. S. SNOWSISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 23-44, 72-
89 (1990), collects similar statements from Wilson and other of the Constitution's authors.
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the President decide other constitutional issues on the basis of ex-
isting law? The concession that a decision about one statute dis-
criminating on account of sex allows the President to cease enforc-
ing others "like" it carries powerful implications.
Perhaps the response is that all of this supposes that the Con-
stitution is "law," to be respected in the same way as other law. If
Congress passes inconsistent laws, the President must choose one
to implement; so too if the law collides with the Constitution. If,
however, we abandon the view that the Constitution is law, treat-
ing it as "policy" made up by judges, then of course the President
must carry out the statute 'til a court makes up the policy. There
isn't any "Constitution" that can collide with the law until the
court establishes it.
Sure enough, only judges have "the power" when the Consti-
tution is solely "what the judges say it is" - by definition. Still, if
"the Constitution" is in flux, if our written Constitution is no
more the Constitution than is the Magna Carta or the Bill of
Rights of 1689 or the latest treatise on moral philosophy, it need
not follow that judges have primacy. In other lands without writ-
ten, binding constitutions, there is no judicial review at all. A
judge's claim to interpret such an unwritten tradition (or to pro-
pose a new one) is no greater than a President's, or a philoso-
pher's. Presidents should not be able to disregard laws on the basis
of philosophical developments - but then judges should not have
this power either.
It is one thing to say that "as a political matter, if not as a
matter of strict legal theory, judicial review of Acts of Congress
for federal constitutionality no longer rests wholly on the argu-
ments of Marbury v. Madison, or on those of Federalist No. 78,"
but "rests also on the visible active, and long-continued acquies-
cence of Congress,"'" a rearrangement after the fashion of nations
(such as England) that lack written constitutions. It is quite some-
thing else again to say that this transformation (if indeed it has
occurred) shuts off powers other branches exercise. Presidents
have not become passive; every President in this century has used
the power of presidential review to refuse to enforce statutes, and
the more recent Presidents have been aggressive about it. Con-
gress has acquiesced in this practice no less than in the Court's
adventurism.
51. C. Black, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 70-71
(1969).
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I happen to think that a view of Constitution-as-policy logi-
cally defeats all claims for judicial review rather than the Execu-
tive Branch's ability to prefer Constitution to law. Judicial review
- a unique institution in which a public official is entitled to dis-
regard statutory law in preference to some other source of legal
rules - depends on the view that the Constitution is law. Mar-
bury says it is, and Marbury is right.
If we grant case law any generative force - any effect be-
yond the parties - that must be because the Constitution in gen-
eral prevails over the law. Any given decision illuminates the
meaning of the Constitution. It is then the Constitution and not
the decision that the President implements in analogous cases.
If the President may act on the strength of a "similar" deci-
sion, he may act without one - for it is still the Constitution that
supplies the rules. It is the Constitution itself, and not the view of
temporary officeholders, that authorizes action.
D
Defense of presidential constitutional power sends chills up
many spines. Some fear that Presidents will confuse the Constitu-
tion with their parties' platforms. Others remember the struggle to
carry out Brown v. Board of Education52 and equate a power to
decide constitutional questions with the power to nullify the Con-
stitution. Cooper v. Aaron 3 settled that question, the refrain goes,
so why reopen old wounds?
There is a big difference between a power in the President
and a power in Orville Faubus. The President is one of three co-
equal branches of the federal government. The supremacy clause
explicitly requires states to follow the Constitution and other fed-
eral law. Binding national law is essential to any nation. I have
been concerned with the allocation of powers within the national
government, not with the relation between the federal government
and the states.
There is also a gulf between a power to implement and a
power to nullify the Constitution. Rhetoric being what it is, one
man's implementation is another's nullification. Justice McReyn-
olds is reputed to have declaimed from the bench during the an-
nouncement of the gold clause cases that "the Constitution, as we
52. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
53. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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have know it, is gone." The projects are different in principle,
though. Real "nullifiers" assert that the Constitution does not gov-
ern state and local affairs, and none of the arguments I have ad-
vanced would give comfort to a nullifier. Interpretation and nullifi-
cation have nothing in common.
To say that a power to interpret may be used as cover for the
power to nullify is not condemn it. Powers of all sorts may be put
to poor use, and those wielding power may dissemble about their
reasons and objectives. The same power of judicial review that
gave us Brown v. Board of Education also gave us Dred Scott,
Plessy v. Ferguson, and Lochner v. New York. If disputes about
interpretation counsel against the exercise of constitutional review,
we shall have to abandon the project: the great majority of consti-
tutional opinions in the Supreme Court these days come with dis-
senting opinions. 54 If misuse of power in the name of the Constitu-
tion is enough to condemn it, then we shall have to abandon
judicial review: Lochner and Plessy reigned longer than Brown.
I grant that the President is more likely to find in the Consti-
tution a rule favorable to his political program than is the Court:
Justices do not have political programs. Presidents declare invalid
statutes that allocate more power to Congress. Ability to hand
yourself, or your political allies, additional power in the name of
the Constitution is a temptation, and the Framers understood that
politicians yield to temptations all too often. Yet Justices find
themselves in the same position. Constitutional cases rarely dimin-
ish the power of courts while enhancing that of the political
branches. Statutory interpretation follows suit. Judges have given
themselves immunity from damages under both Constitution and
statutes, while deciding that members of other branches must pay.
Judges also make decisions that promote their own conceptions of
proper government, a form of self-interested behavior.5" If judges
may (and do) look after the interests of the judicial branch, there
is no principled objection to the like power - and the like poten-
tial for misuse - in the President.56
54. Easterbrook, Agreement Among the Justices: An Empirical Note, 1984 S. CT.
REv. 389, 392-95.
55. See Easterbrook, What's So Special About Judges?, - COLO. L. REv.
(1990) (forthcoming).
56. Rauol Berger, who believes that Presidents generally must enforce laws that they
think are unconstitutional, makes an exception when the President's own powers are at
stake. See R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 306-09 (1974).
Limiting the power of presidential review to those in which the President's self-interest
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Now for the other bogeyman: the belief that if the President
may entertain constitutional views at all, he may ignore the Su-
preme Court. President Lincoln once did this (he refused to re-
lease a prisoner despite Chief Justice Taney's writ of habeas
corpus), but no other President has followed suit. None should -
and the arguments I have been discussing do not allow for disobe-
dience. There is a fundamental difference between carrying out an
order of the court, rendered in a case within the court's jurisdic-
tion, and acquiescing in a rule of decision, a difference Lincoln
cleaved to in calmer moments. Article III of the Constitution cre-
ates the "judicial Power of the United States," and a "judicial
Power" is one to render dispositive judgements. People may disa-
gree about the meaning of the Constitution or the generality of its
commends without doubting that a judgment conclusively resolves
the case. Orville Faubus was more than a nullifier; he denied the
power of the Supreme Curt to resolve a case to which the state
was a party.
The difference between the binding force of a decision and
the rule of decision that produced it underlies much of jurispru-
dence Courts frequently explain their judgments in novel or
sweeping ways, and no one expects the President to streak off in
whatever, direction an opinion pointed most recently. Justices
themselves do not do so, and a number of doctrines confine the
power of judgments. Non-parties are free to disregard them. The
Executive Branch, party to thousands of lawsuits, may stick to its
(legal) guns, asserting in tomorrow's case theories that were re-
jected in yesterday's.5 7 President Lincoln dealt with Dred Scott in
a way we would today call "nonacquiescence." He told members
of the executive branch to treat African-Americans as citizens,
despite that case, whenever possible: they received passports, pat-
ents, and other recognition available only to citizens, although the
Court had said they could not be citizens. 8
makes his judgment least dispassionate is a curious inversion. Self-interested decisions are
the hardest to justify.
57. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984), holds that the Executive
Branch need not follow the legal views of the lower courts beyond the bounds of the case.
See Diller & Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of
Law: A Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801 (1990); Estreicher &
Revesz, The Uneasy Case Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence: A Reply, 99 YALE L.J.
831 (1990); Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies,
98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989).
58. 5 THE WORKS OF CHARLES SUMNER 497-98 (D. Donald ed. 1880); 6 id. at 144.
926 [Vol. 40:905
PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW
This leads to a related objection: presidential review will pre-
vent the courts from deciding constitutional questions. If the Pres-
ident declines to enforce a law, there may be no occasion for the
Supreme Court to give its own opinion. It follows, the argument
would go, that the President must at least direct the Solicitor
General to press the law with enough vigor to obtain a constitu-
tional decision, a course followed in Lovett and Chadha.
Prudence may counsel this course, but the Constitution does
not compel it. For one thing, litigation is apt to ensue even if the
President refuses all enforcement. A beneficiary of the law could
file suit in an effort to obtain what Congress bestowed. Whether
or not a private party has standing does not matter, however.
Judges exist to decide cases, not to resolve issues. Constitutional
decisions are byproducts of real cases, not the raison d'etre of the
judicial system. Decrees are the ends of live controversies, not a
means to settle abstract questions. 59 If the political branches ar-
range their affairs so as to eliminate occasions for litigation,
neither the courts nor the people have a complaint.
E
Presidential review is neither a power to nullify nor a power
to disregard judgments. It is important and beneficial in five prin-
cipal classes of disputes that raise neither problem:
(1) Constitutional limitations constrain governmental power.
No one may go to jail - the government may not act in many
other ways - unless multiple holders of power concur in the con-
stitutionality of that decision. Congress must enact the law; the
executive branch must prosecute; the court must convict. At each
step the person' exercising the power of government must decide
whether the Constitution authorizes the step. This is plain enough
in criminal cases. Acknowledging the power of presidential review
shows that it holds throughout the system of government. Each
branch brings to the problem its distinctive perspective, enriching
our civic discourse, and consensus supports any action eventually
taken.
(2) Many disputes do not entail much prospect of judicial
resolution, given the case-or-controversy requirement of Article
59. Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1 (1988); Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755 (1987);
Alliance to End Repression v. Chicago, 820 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1987).
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111.60 Foreign policy and fiscal affairs rarely end up in court, mak-
ing the President's constitutional decision the end of the line - as
Congress's constitutional decision would be, if we were to deny the
existence of presidential review.
(3) Many more disputes fester for years, decades, even centu-
ries between enactment of the legislation and authoritative resolu-
tion by a court. The Sedition Act took 163 years, the Tenure of
Office Act 60 years, and these are not isolated examples. In the
interim legislative and executive officials must decide whether the
law is constitutional or not, and act accordingly. No one doubts
that Senators could vote yea or nay on the articles of impeach-
ment laid against President Johnson on the basis of their conclu-
sion that the Tenure of Office Act was (or was not) constitutional.
President Johnson needed the same power of decision, lest the lim-
itations in article III ensnare the political branches into enduring
disregard of the Constitution.
(4) Once the Court resolves a point of constitutional law, a
power of presidential review ensures quick compliance. The win-
nowing of the social security laws for sex-based classifications is a
case in point. Brown provides an even more vivid example (at the
expense of moving to state-federal relations, which I promised not
to do). Getting as far as we have in eliminating segregation and
its vestiges has taken almost two generations and hundreds of
suits. But the volume of litigation is as nothing compared with the
number of school districts that desegregated on their own. If exec-
utive officials must follow the law until slapped with an injunction,
then recalcitrant officials were right to drag their heels, and the
many who took Brown seriously and desegregated were violating
their duties! Once the Court held that states may not exclude
women from jury venires,"1 it was unnecessary to bring 49 more
suits, or perhaps 3,041 more (one per county), to achieve compli-
ance throughout the nation. There were 83,186 local governments
in the United States in 1987 and oodles of state agencies;62 I
shudder to think that none of them need comply with the Consti-
tution until told to by a judge, one clause as a time. Presidential
review, executive review in general, speeds up the process of com-
60. See Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign and Defense
Policy: A Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 463 (1976); Dam, The American Fiscal
Constitution, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 271 (1977).
61. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
62. 1990 Statistical Abstract of the United States table 454.
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pliance with constitutional norms.
(5) The disagreeable corollary, to many, is the belief that
presidential review can have the reverse effect. It can't. Presiden-
tial review will not speed up compliance if the President does not
agree with the Court - but even then compliance, coming one
case at a time, will be no slower than it would be if there were no
power of presidential review. It is the duty to put the Constitution
ahead of the law that requires compliance without one suit per
school district. If executive officials are forbidden to place Consti-
tution over law, that produces the ultimate in heel-dragging, for
no one acts until a judge orders him to. What presidential review
(and legislative review) does is facilitate challenges to judicial de-
cisions. Those who resisted Lochner by enacting and carrying out
laws could claims that they were acting within their powers when
disagreeing with the Court.
Presidential review is in this sense a counterweight to judicial
review. Life tenure has conflicting effects on. the judicial system. It
is designed to (and does) liberate judges from current politics.
This could lead them to carry out their personal agendas. It is
suppose to have the former effect; an unpleasant byproduct is that
for some portion of judges it has the latter. Separated and over-
lapping powers of review can help control the phenomenon.
We live in a constitutional republic in which many actors
hold overlapping powers. Powers are not so much separated as du-
plicated and distributed, so that concurrent approval is necessary
to action. This is not an efficient system; it is designed to frustrate
all claims of power. Presidential review fits neatly in such a
framework. We live in a constitutional republic. Contemporary of-
ficeholders are but squatters in that mansion. All owe their duties
to the real owners.
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